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The question of how to draw the distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics is central to the philosophy of language. As the title sug-
gests, this volume seeks to approach the question via the intuitive 
and yet controversial notion of what is said in uttering a sentence, and 
the way that this notion affects our understanding of other phenom-
ena. In particular, an emphasis is placed on how developments in the 
last decade or so have shed new light on this matter.
Grice thought that what is said in uttering a sentence is closely 
related to the conventional meaning of the sentence; he only explic-
itly allowed the time of the utterance, the fixing of any referential 
expressions, and the resolution of any ambiguities to be contextual 
factors that are relevant to such content. A tradition has followed 
this approach in seeking to place an emphasis on the role of semantic 
processes in determining what is said. Such views are represented in 
the Semantics First section of this volume. A distinct approach to the 
matter takes it that various pragmatic processes are essential to fix 
what is said. This approach is represented in the Pragmatics First sec-
tion. The final Alternatives section consists of papers from authors 
who have sought to reject assumptions held by one or both of the 
aforementioned groups. But despite this tripartite distinction, the 
editors are right to make clear in the preface that while it is tempting 
to subsume each paper into a general category, close attention should 
be paid to the arguments of each individual piece (p. x). Indeed, it 
proves difficult to arrange the available views even into the general 
sections outlined. For instance, minimalism is placed in the Seman-
tics First section, even though few minimalists would agree with the 
characterisation of the view as claiming “that ‘what is said’ by an ut-
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terance is fully determined by syntax and semantics” (p. 13). Instead, 
many minimalists allow that what is said will be a context-sensitive 
matter and in so doing hold many points of agreement with those 
views represented in the Pragmatics First section.
Stojnic and Lepore’s contribution—the first of the collection—
represents this point concerning minimalism well. They follow Cap-
pelen and Lepore (Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensitive 
Semantics, Oxford, 2005) in arguing that it is not the task of a se-
mantic theory to assign true indirect speech reports to utterances; 
a semantic theory does not have to account for what an utterance 
said. Instead, Stojnic and Lepore suggest a rather novel minimalist 
approach. They argue that a semantic theory should be based upon 
Lewis’ two ideas of the conversational scoreboard and coordination. 
A conversational scoreboard is an abstract record of all the infor-
mation communicated and exchanged between conversational par-
ticipants. Conversational participants face the challenge of updating 
their scoreboards in the same way as one another, so as to avoid mis-
understanding. To avoid this coordination problem, participants will 
make use of conventions, defined here as a regularity observed by 
agents with a view to matching their behaviour with other agents. 
Stojnic and Lepore argue that it is the job of a semantic theory to 
track the shared knowledge of linguistic conventions that agents will 
use to adjust their scoreboard upon hearing an utterance. More for-
mally, the adequacy constraint on a semantic theory is as follows:
A semantic theory T for a language L should assign as semantic content 
to an utterance u of a sentence S of L whatever u of S contributes to the 
conversational record in virtue of coordination. (p. 33)
As Stojnic and Lepore allow, a semantic theory of this kind will prove 
quite liberal in what it takes to be semantic phenomena, including 
presuppositions and conventional implicatures. But Lewis’s notion of 
a convention is concerned with action in general, and one wonders 
if such a view is properly able to distinguish between linguistic and 
non-linguistic conventions. Chess players may exploit the conven-
tions of the game to communicate a great deal of information with 
an utterance such as “Your queen is exposed”, but it is not the job 
of semantic theory to track such conventions. The view will benefit 
from further discussion on this matter.
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The broad views of minimalism and indexicalism are represented 
well in the Semantics First section. Both views take the output of se-
mantic processes to be a proposition, but indexicalism differs from 
minimalism in taking this proposition to be what is said in uttering 
that sentence. In doing so, indexicalism takes the appeal to contex-
tual features within semantic processes to be far more common. It is 
appropriate that an abridged version of Stanley’s “Context and Logi-
cal Form” is reprinted here as the third chapter, as this has emerged 
as probably one of the most influential forms of indexicalism.
There are, of course, forms of indexicalism aside from Stanley’s, 
and this is represented in Vignolo’s contribution. In “Surprise In-
dexicalism”, he argues that there are more indexical expressions than 
just the set of indexicals and demonstratives. Otherwise put, there 
are many more expressions whose (Kaplanian) character allows for 
a variation in content across contexts. Details permitting, both co-
lour adjectives and comparative adjectives (such as ‘tall’) are indexi-
cal in this way. According to Vignolo, positing such indexicality is 
only justified in those cases that admit of incompleteness arguments. 
Cappelen and Lepore (Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensi-
tive Semantics, Oxford, 2005 pp. 59-69), however, have argued that 
incompleteness arguments can be given for any sentence in a natural 
language, and so the move to positing extra indexical expressions is 
the first step on a slippery slope to radical contextualism. Further, 
they have argued that intuitions regarding such cases miss the point 
as they are metaphysical intuitions regarding what properties ex-
ist, rather than semantic intuitions. Vignolo responds to both argu-
ments. Regarding the latter argument, he argues that such intuitions 
are in fact semantically relevant insofar as a semantic theory must ac-
count for the implicit knowledge required to understand a language. 
As such, an incompleteness argument tells us that competent speak-
ers feel unable to evaluate the truth of a sentence independently of a 
context, and so we are given reason to suppose that such a sentence 
is context-dependent. But crucially, however, Vignolo must also re-
spond to Cappelen and Lepore’s “slippery slope” argument so as to 
avoid the proliferation of indexicality. After all, just as a sentence 
such as ‘John is tall’ leads us to raise the question of what standard 
John is tall according to, sentences that are not usually claimed to be 
incomplete (e.g. ‘John went to the gym’) raise questions of a similar 
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nature (e.g. how did John go? Did he go inside? How long for?). Here, 
Vignolo simply rejects the claim that speakers do not know how to 
evaluate sentences such as ‘John went to the gym’ independently of 
contextual completions (p. 71). But given that Cappelen and Lepore 
have given us reason to question the distinction between complete 
and incomplete sentences, Vignolo’s argument would benefit from 
further reason to maintain such a distinction.
The difference between the Semantics First and Pragmatics First 
sections is perhaps best described as one of tradition and approach, 
rather than as one of theoretical claims. For instance, Claudia Bi-
anchi begins the Pragmatics First section by arguing that the context 
relevant to reference-fixing in the case of indexicals and to force-
fixing in the case of illocutionary acts is the context intended by the 
speaker and made available to the hearer. And while identifying the 
proper role for speaker’s intentions in semantic and pragmatic theory 
is a crucial issue, Bianchi’s conclusion by itself is not something that 
the minimalist and indexicalist views outlined in the first section are 
forced to deny. A similar, though not identical, point can be made 
regarding Catherine Wearing’s contribution in chapter eight. She 
argues for the view that metaphorical content is realised at the level 
of what is said rather than implicature, via a defence of the scope 
argument. Perhaps most intriguing about this article is the sugges-
tion made towards the end that the realisation of metaphor in what 
is said could even be accommodated by Stanley’s indexical approach, 
which claims that all context-sensitivity is mandated by a variable 
present in the logical form of a sentence (p. 157). However, this 
would seem to require that every expression-type capable of being 
used metaphorically has some kind of metaphor-variable realised in 
its syntactic contribution.
Robyn Carston’s contribution stands out by directly challenging 
the view held by both minimalists and indexicalists (and indeed some 
pragmatists) that word meanings are not fully-fledged concepts com-
plete with a denotation. Her argument is twofold. First, the context-
sensitivity of word meanings suggest that there is no one privileged 
concept that constitutes the meaning of an expression, and that in-
stead each expression only provides a conceptual schema that must be 
fleshed out into a concept on each occasion of use. Secondly, Carston 
points to experimental evidence based on processing considerations 
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that suggests that in the case of polysemous expressions, hearers first 
access a general, underspecified conceptual schema and then flesh it 
out into one particular concept based on subsequent contextual cues. 
This underspecificity of polysemous expressions generalises insofar 
as all open-class expressions are “polysemous or at least potentially 
polysemous” (p. 192).
The Alternatives section is a lively one that consists of six papers 
from a range of different viewpoints. Joana Garmendia uses chapter 
twelve to argue that the social rewards associated with ironic com-
munication is better accommodated by a Gricean implicature-based 
account. In chapter fifteen, Michael Devitt outlines three flaws that 
he argues are prevalent among the pragmatist approach represented 
in the second section.
Semantic relativism, which has attracted much discussion over 
the past decade, is represented (albeit indirectly) in John MacFar-
lane’s paper “Non indexical Contextualism”, reprinted here as chap-
ter thirteen. Here, MacFarlane outlines a form of context-sensitivity 
in which the truth value, but not the content, of a proposition is 
dependent upon a parameter, the value of which is determined by the 
context of utterance. He labels such a view non-indexical contextu-
alism, which given the fact that this collection already uses the labels 
of contextualism and indexicalism in quite a distinct way, is perhaps 
not the most helpful name. Nevertheless, his exposition of the view 
is clear enough so as to avoid confusion.
MacFarlane’s paper is useful when considering Corazza and Do-
kic’s contribution in chapter fourteen, which outlines their situ-
ationalist view. They argue that contextualists, indexicalists, and 
minimalists alike have laid too large a cognitive burden upon con-
versational participants. For a hearer to understand an utterance, it 
is not necessary that she must entertain a thought with the unarticu-
lated constituents that it is argued may accompany such an utterance 
via free enrichment. However, the truth value of such an utterance 
(and indeed of the corresponding thought) can be dependent upon 
parameters not present in the content of an utterance, purely in vir-
tue of the fact that such utterances are situated. The idea here is that 
utterances and propositions are anchored to situations, and these 
situations can affect the truth value of these propositions without 
doing so via its content.
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As Corazza and Dokic note, the proposal is most akin to a form 
of non indexical contextualism outlined by MacFarlane in which the 
truth of a proposition is relative to a “counts-as” parameter. As such, 
situationalism can be seen as differing from many other relativist 
proposals, not only in that there is a single privileged context from 
which semantic evaluation should take place, but also in the fact that 
relativising the truth of propositions to a situation means that there 
is no restraint on what situational factors can affect the truth value of 
a proposition. Whereas many relativist proposals suggest merely that 
the truth of a proposition should be relativised to a specific param-
eter such as a standard of taste or an epistemic standard, situational-
ism allows a variation on nearly any parameter to affect the truth of 
a proposition. As such, free enrichment of communicated content 
is not required on this view. One fruitful topic of discussion for the 
situationalist proposal would be whether, despite our utterances and 
thoughts being anchored, free enrichment can nevertheless occur on 
some occasions, despite not being necessary to account for the intui-
tive truth values of such utterances.
One distinctive theme that recurs throughout this collection is 
how modes of presentation (both linguistic and cognitive) are to be 
accommodated within semantic theory. In chapter nine, François 
Récanati approaches this by arguing that the semantic reference of 
a definite description is fixed by the mental file associated with the 
singular predicate contained within the definite description, rather 
than by the singular predicate itself. Kepa Korta also confronts ref-
erence and cognition in chapter eleven when he argues that there is 
no single proposition called what is said that can serve as both what 
a speaker meant in uttering something, and the basis from which 
to calculate implicatures. This is because across different contexts 
propositions that differ in the kind of cognitive fix contained within 
them are required in order to calculate implicatures. In some, the 
hearer must access the referential content in order to calculate impli-
catures, while in others, only the speaker-bound or utterance-bound 
content is required.
Finally in chapter sixteen, following Kripke’s famous puzzle 
about belief, John Perry seeks to show why inferring ‘Pierre said 
that London is pretty’ from ‘Pierre said “London is pretty”’ (which 
Perry labels disquotation) is not valid, and neither is inferring ‘Pierre 
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believes that London is pretty’ from ‘Pierre said that London is 
pretty’ (which Perry labels content explanation). Crimmins and Perry 
(Mark Crimmins and John Perry, “The Prince and the Phone Both: 
Reporting Puzzling Belief”, Journal of Philosophy, 86, 1989) argued 
that the latter inference is not valid because a belief report may not 
properly track the notions that the agent (Pierre) uses to think about 
the relevant objects. Such notions are present in belief reports as un-
articulated constituents, and so the truth value of the belief report 
will partly turn on whether they are the notions used by the agent. 
Here Perry builds on this approach and argues that disquotation may 
not properly track the roles that an object plays in a speaker’s life. Just 
as notions are represented as unarticulated constituents in belief re-
ports, roles are represented as unarticulated constituents in indirect 
speech reports. Perry’s innovative proposal aside, it is fitting that he 
should complete this volume as the influence that his work has had is 
plain to see throughout.
This collection constitutes an excellent survey of the issues sur-
rounding the pragmatic/semantic distinction, with fine contribu-
tions from esteemed authors. What this collection serves to show is 
that the notion of what is said is philosophically crucial, and not only 
because it is intuitive. How it is accounted for will affect and be af-
fected by a vast range of phenomena including context-sensitivity, 
metaphor, irony, speech acts, modes of presentation, and method-
ological considerations. As such, one key way for this discussion to 
develop, which this collection contributes towards, is from further 
integration of these areas of research. And yet the resulting com-
plexity of the issues is handled ably by the editors, who provide the 
student reader unaccustomed to the area with a historical introduc-
tion and a brief summary of each chapter. This volume will therefore 
prove useful for researchers and students alike.
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